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Christian dispensation. We cannot blame Knox for forgetting what he never knew, and we are not surprised to have Mr. Lang suddenly take the wind out of his modern indignation by saying (p. 240), "If Knox could have understood *that*, he would not have been Knox." The next sentence, however, says that Knox "never chose" to understand.

Mr. Lang has a strong feeling of antipathy for "the nascent kirk with the fire-new doctrine", his studies in St. Augustine not having, perhaps, reached the field of doctrine. "Lawful ministers" is frequently quoted to express a contempt for the lawfulness, and the preachers are injuriously referred to as "apostate monks or priests or artisans". That they were only six or seven at first is apparently a discredit, and that they should share in the power of the keys is specially grotesque: "persons who, being fluent preachers, have persuaded local sets of Protestants to accept them as ministers. These preachers having a 'call'—it might be from a set of perfidious and profligate murderers—are somehow gifted with the apostolic grace of binding on earth what shall be bound in heaven." But the impetuous Anglican might have noted that the apostolic grace belonged to these preachers only as organs of the church. After hearing from Mr. Lang about the Catholic clergy, "ignorant, brutal, and licentious younger sons and bastards of noble families" (p. 7), it is a relief to know that the Book of Discipline "secured a thoroughly moral clergy, till, some twelve years later, the nobles again thrust licentious and murderous cadets into the best livings and the bastard bishoprics" (p. 188). May not such passages suggest an extenuation of the drastic and painful diction of the reformer and agitator, a diction less modern because it often expresses a thing as offensive to the sense of smell?

We are guided, then, through the details of the Scottish Reformation for the express purpose of seeing how Knox lied and intrigued and to what extreme of intolerance he carried his principles. Barring some matters where erroneous or contradictory statements of Knox may be due to misinformation or fault of memory, Mr. Lang seems to make out his case and to shatter any reputation for integrity which Knox may have enjoyed. Its *saeve indignatio* may not always be earnest, but the work is a painful contribution to the literature of exposure.

FRANCIS A. CHRISTIE.

Fighting Instructions, 1530-1816. Edited with elucidations from contemporary authorities by JULIAN S. CORBETT, LL.M. (London: The Navy Records Society. 1905. Pp. xvi, 366.)

THIS book, of great interest to the naval officer, gives the gradual development of British naval tactics under sail. At the beginning of the long stretch of time covered by the book, nearly three hundred years (1530-1816), there was no methodic handling of a squadron in action, and it took nearly two hundred and fifty years to arrive at any really effective tactics. Sail, in the rough ocean at least, had displaced the

oared galley, and with the disappearance of oars as a motive power had gone all attempts to keep formation. The old galley disposition of attack was much the same as a line of battle ashore, that is, they were usually in line abreast. This was the arrangement at Lepanto, generally, it may be said in parenthesis, looked upon as a Spanish victory, because the chief in command was the Austrian bastard of the Spanish Charles I. (Charles V. of the Empire); but the Spaniards had but twelve galleys in the fight out of the nearly three hundred engaged.

All the same, as shown by Mr. Corbett, one of the earliest systems of tactics under sail came from Spain, though the treatise by Alonso de Chaves, the *Espejo de Navegantes* (*The Seamen's Looking-glass*), was never published until lately, when found by Captain Fernandez Duro, the historian of the Spanish navy, in the library of the Academy of History at Madrid. Chaves, who, as mentioned by Corbett, was one of the seamen writers of the time of Charles V., had very fair general views, both as to single ship and fleet actions. Following the galley practice to which Mediterranean nations were accustomed, his formation was in line abreast and not the line ahead (or what we term column) which became universal later. Regard must be had to the singular unhandiness of early-day ships: ridiculously short (it was a large ship which was over a hundred feet); with huge blockhouses and cabins at head and stern; with bellying sails, so made to hold the wind, not much in the way of manœuvres could be expected. Though English orders of 1545, betraying strongly, in Mr. Corbett's view, the influence of Chaves's ideas (through the alliance of Henry VIII. with Charles V.), show very definite views of a tactical formation, these seem to have died out, as it seems pretty clear that the attacks upon the Spanish Armada in 1588 were simply following up a fleeing and demoralized foe, neither assailant nor defender keeping any real formation. The first instructions known to be issued to an English fleet after the time of Henry VIII. were signed by Raleigh in 1617 when about to sail on his expedition to Guiana. But these were rather a set of regulations for the general government of the squadron, and future orders were for many years of like character.

With the English and Dutch wars of the middle of the seventeenth century came the use of the line ahead. Mr. Corbett makes out a strong case for its use first by the English, but there is a general vagueness in the accounts of nearly all the old fleet actions, and it is very probable that both combatants dropped into such a formation, which comes perfectly naturally on the principle of "follow your leader". In any case, with this war the instructions took on a more tactical character, and a line ahead formation was very definitely established in the English instructions of 1653. Monck and Prince Rupert, soldier-admirals without any previous experience of the sea, did much to establish formal tactics, but they took tactical risks and unfettered "individual initiative to almost any extent rather than miss the chance of overpowering the enemy by a sudden well-timed blow".

The school represented by the Duke of York (James II.) and Admiral Penn (the father of William Penn of Pennsylvania) brought about the rigid adherence to the formality of the next century, which, until broken through by Rodney in his action with de Grasse in 1782, prevented a decisive action for nearly a hundred years, tried Admiral Mathews and Captain Hawke for leaving the line and coming to close quarters in 1744 in the action off Toulon with the combined French and Spanish fleet, and made the fleet actions of the period travesties of the real battles fought in the previous century. The change was in breaking the enemy's line and attacking a remnant with a superior force instead of attempting, as the earlier eighteenth-century tactics required, to bring each ship against its opposite in the enemy's formation and keeping at the same time as rigidly to one's own formation in line (ahead) as possible. It was a Scotchman, Clerk, who had never been to sea, who was the first to press upon the English admiralty, with effectiveness, the new idea, which he had developed upon a table with miniature ships, showing how difficult it would be in the long line, often five miles in length, for the main body to return to the aid of a small portion so attacked. (And, curiously enough, it was for a Jesuit priest, Hoste, who had, however, seen much sea-service, to produce, in 1697, the most elaborate system of French tactics.) Whether Rodney's cutting through and bringing to close action the rear of the French line was the outcome of his discussions of Clerk's views (of which he had knowledge) or somewhat accidental is a moot question, but, in any case, it was the forerunner of the practice of the English admirals in the great wars which were soon to follow. An example, carried to the point of rashness, was Nelson's action at Trafalgar, in which his fleet in two widely-separated columns broke through the line of the French and Spanish at nearly right angles. The purpose was triumphantly accomplished, but it was a bold disregard of consequences which should ensue from an attack so conducted against an efficient foe. But he knew his enemies; he had in one a navy the trained officers of which had been swept away in the cyclone of the French Revolution and not replaced; in the other a power as defective in training, equipment, and in the sea habit as it was ninety-three years later.

It may be noted that the usage of distinguishing squadrons by three colors of flags, which developed into having three orders of flag-officers (admirals of the red, the white, and the blue), had its origin in 1625; also that each commander-in-chief had his own system of signals until toward the end of the eighteenth century, when a systematic usage began to obtain. That those of earlier days, cumbersome and inefficient beyond belief, should have held their own so long, does not speak well for naval inventiveness during the long period covered by this interesting study and compilation. As a final word it may be said, speaking humanly, that American independence was the result of Admiral Graves's adherence in 1781 to the formal tactics of his time. Had he

attacked de Grasse off the capes of the Chesapeake with the tactics of Rodney, he would probably have defeated de Grasse as did Rodney. In such case Graves, instead of de Grasse, would have entered the Chesapeake; Cornwallis would have been rescued from his peril; the British would have had complete command of the sea; the long march of the allies southward would have come to naught; and the whole struggle would have assumed another and a most disheartening aspect. It is in such studies that the importance of such books lies.

Histoire de France depuis les Origines jusqu'à la Révolution. (Publiée sous la direction de M. ERNEST LAVISSE.) Tome VI., 2. *Henri IV. et Louis XIII. (1598-1643).* Par JEAN H. MARIÉJOL, Professeur à l'Université de Lyon. (Paris: Hachette et Cie. 1905. Pp. 493.)

THIS volume is an improvement upon the one which immediately precedes it from the same pen. M. Mariéjol excels in the writing of purely political and diplomatic history, and is farther away, in the seventeenth century, from certain prejudices that compromise his earlier production. Like each volume in the series, the present one deals with the entire history of France during a given time—in this case France from 1598 to 1643. But as a matter of fact it resolves itself into a series of studies in politics and diplomacy, united by shorter intermediate essays upon the culture-history of the period. This duality sometimes embarrasses the reader, for he does not always see things in their relations or appreciate the full bearing of certain events. Moreover, the internal and the external history of France are treated so separately that the reciprocal influence of events within and events without is sometimes missed. If the book had been written by different authors, as some of the series have been and as the Cambridge series is throughout, it probably would not have exhibited greater variance in this particular. A good example of this is the treatment of Richelieu's dealings in Italy in 1629.

The first book, which deals with the history of Henry IV. after the Edict of Nantes, is of a double nature, being an epilogue to the period of the civil wars and a prologue to the era of Richelieu. There are admirable studies in this part of Henry IV.'s reconstructive policy, of Sully's economies, and above all of the foreign policy of the first Bourbon. In this writing the author has rightly relied a good deal upon Philippson and Rott. But he has too closely followed Henrard's *Henri IV. et la Princesse de Condé* in the account of Henry's proposed intervention in Clèves. He minimizes the political thought of Henry IV. and exaggerates his passion. Even admitting that the king's love for the fair Charlotte this time did influence him politically (as never had been the case before), it nevertheless remains true that political necessity required firm conduct on Henry's part toward Spain. The Prince of Condé had been making so extravagant a display of Huguenot inclina-